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THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND FINANCIAL 
FLOWS BETWEEN SLOVENIA AND EU AFTER THE ACCESSION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
On 13. of December 2002 Slovenia has, with the other nine candidate countries, 
successfully concluded accession negotiations with the EU. Results obtained on the 
financial issues for the period 2004-2006 point out to the following official conclusions: a) 
stated aims were fulfilled for the agriculture sector (possibility for direct payments from 
own budget; the same level of direct payments from the year 2007 on; production quotas 
are not below the level of current production; financial very attractive solution for the rural 
development, b) for the regional policy and structural funds Slovenia will get 404 millions 
of EUR; there is also a possibility for the further regionalization on the NUTS-2 level c) 
EU will partially cover the costs (45% - 107 millions EUR) for the construction and 
maintenance of the Schengen border, d) regarding the transfers and the net budget position 
Slovenia succeeded to raise budgetary compensation from 45 millions EUR in the year 
2003 to 85 millions of EUR for each year with the 2004-2006 period, e) Slovenian net 
budgetary position will be a positive one and Slovenia will have also quite favourable 
position (retain its positive net budgetary position) in the period of the next financial 
perspective 2007-1013.  
 
These conclusions should in fact demonstrate that for the financial part of negotiations 
Slovenia succeeded to achieve the best combination in order to fulfill two aims: a) 
agreement with EU should enable the continuation of the process of real convergence, and 
b) the agreement should not worsen budgetary position and thus provide difficulties with 
the fiscal part of Maastricht criteria. 
 
But, are all these very favourable official conclusions reflecting reality? Were all effects of 
financial package taken into account and all the transfers between both budgets estimated 
correctly? Are there any other financial flows connected with the accession? 
 
Within the paper we will try to answer to the above questions with the analysis of the 
continued foreign trade liberalization process, the official transfers between both budgets 
and some additional financial flows and effects on domestic budget. Namely, one should 
take into account decreased budget revenues due to the complete liberalisation of trade 
with the EU and candidate countries as well as the decreased efficiency of value added tax 
collection. And, on the other hand, there will be additional transfers to the EU institutions 
and increased costs due to the preparation of Schengen border with Croatia. A partial 
equilibrium analysis will be then complemented by the general equilibrium simulation 
results in order to estimate the more complex mutual effects at the aggregate and sectoral 
levels. The static CGE model used (Majcen and Buehrer, 2001) is broadly based upon the 
model used in Buehrer (1994) augmented with data from the 1998 SAM and parameters 
from the GTAP model (Hertel, 1997). The basic structure is similar to that used in many 
CGE models of developing countries, e.g. Devarajan, Lewis and Robinson (1991), in 
previous models of Yugoslavia, Labus (1990), and in models of transition economies, 
Silver and Tesche (1992).1  
 
                                                 
1  Detailed description and complete equation specification of the model is presented in the Appendix. 
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The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 the process of further foreign trade 
liberalization is presented together with the calculation of the average rates of collected 
import duties in the period 1998-2001 and after the accession into the EU. In Section 3 the 
Slovenian net budgetary position is analyzed and in section 4 some of the simulation 
results are presented. Final Section summarizes the basic findings of the study and sets out 
some implications for further work. 
 
2. FOREIGN TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN THE PROCESS OF INCLUSION 
OF THE R OF SLOVENIA INTO THE EU  
 
In this section estimation of the levels and changes of the rates of import duties due to 
continued foreign trade liberalisation process after the year 1998 which in fact cover: a) 
full implementation of Free Trade Agreements (in the year 2001), b) the process of gradual 
adjusting of Slovenian Customs Tariff to the EU Common External Tariff for 
manufacturing products, c) complete liberalization of trade with EU and candidate 
countries after the accession, and d) adoption of EU Common Customs Tariff and trade 
regime after the accession into the EU.  
The results obtained certainly show quickly continued process of foreign trade 
liberalisation with the adoption of new customs system, the entrance into the GATT/WTO, 
signement of several FTAs and particular of the Europe Agreement. High orientation of 
Slovenian economy towards foreign markets is revealed also in the low paid tariff rates for 
the imports from the third countries (Table 1). Full implementation of almost all 
agreements was finished in the year 2001.  
 
Analysis of the average rates of collected import duties in the year 2001 shows very low 
figures on the aggregate level (1,2%), as well as on the level of imports from the EU-15 
(0,7%), candidate countries (1,2%) and third countries (2,5%). Outstanding results were 
found for the agricultural products - in case of Europe and other FTA agreements they 
reveal the fact that these products are subject of concessions only to the some extent. And 
these are products for which we can expect the greatest trade diversion/creation effects 
after the inclusion of Slovenia into the EU.2 
 
Theoretically, Europe and almost all other FTA should be fully implemented with the 
beginning of the year 2001. Nevertheless, more than 11 bill. SIT were collected on the 
imports from the EU countries. The main reason can be found in the imports of agricultural 
products that contribute 8,8 bill. SIT of import duties (see Table 2). Very interesting is also 
the group of products from other sectors that were imported without the use of preferential 
treatment within the Europe Agreement – for these products importers paid more than 2 
bill. SIT of import duties. Obviously it was simpler (or even cheaper) to pay tariff 
according to the official Customs tariff than to use preferential treatment.  
                                                 
2  Lower average rates of import duties for the import from the third countries are primarily the 
outcome of the different structure of imports of agricultural products. 
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Table 1: Average rates of collected import duties on Slovenian imports from different groups of countries  
               for the years 1998 and 2001     
1998 2001 CHANGE (%) 
SECTOR 
Total EU15 ‘Laeken’ group 
The rest of 
The World Total EU15 
‘Laeken’ 
group 
The rest of 
The World Total EU15 
‘Laeken’ 
group 
The rest of 
The World 
A 6,20 10,02 7,80 2,18 3,93 6,52 2,84 2,00 -36,5 -35,0 -63,6 -8,3 
B 3,01 2,28 11,85 3,73 2,21 2,16 0,96 2,39 -26,4 -5,2 -91,9 -35,8 
CA 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,24 0,01 0,01 0,26 - - - - 
CB 0,34 0,28 0,06 0,44 0,28 0,04 0,05 0,50 -17,5 -86,0 -20,2 12,8 
DA 12,61 14,55 13,60 8,97 10,36 11,75 10,56 7,65 -17,9 -19,2 -22,4 -14,7 
DB 2,43 1,41 0,83 7,36 1,46 0,07 0,50 6,57 -39,9 -95,0 -39,4 -10,7 
DC 5,16 2,73 0,73 12,22 2,35 0,14 0,22 11,10 -54,4 -94,7 -69,4 -9,2 
DD 0,77 0,88 0,29 0,69 0,33 0,14 0,16 0,81 -57,0 -83,7 -44,5 16,5 
DE 1,80 1,92 0,40 1,96 0,26 0,11 0,03 1,06 -85,5 -94,1 -91,4 -45,7 
DF 2,41 2,32 0,11 2,88 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,03 -99,3 -99,8 -71,2 -99,0 
DG 1,08 1,13 0,12 1,26 0,30 0,14 0,04 0,91 -72,4 -87,6 -70,1 -27,9 
DH 2,60 2,34 0,18 6,08 0,65 0,16 0,15 4,07 -75,0 -93,2 -17,2 -33,2 
DI 1,93 2,03 0,30 2,39 0,31 0,08 0,16 1,40 -84,1 -96,2 -46,9 -41,2 
DJ 0,99 1,11 0,06 1,40 0,25 0,08 0,05 0,85 -74,8 -92,6 -14,4 -39,0 
DK 1,77 1,51 0,28 3,34 0,63 0,16 0,35 3,29 -64,3 -89,2 25,4 -1,7 
DL 1,80 1,13 0,55 3,25 0,72 0,20 0,27 1,73 -60,3 -81,9 -49,8 -46,7 
DM 3,33 2,56 0,66 7,83 0,64 0,13 0,08 5,71 -80,8 -95,1 -87,1 -27,1 
DN 2,95 1,40 0,54 9,76 2,43 0,40 0,42 9,19 -17,8 -71,0 -21,3 -5,9 
E 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 - - - - 
Total 2,68 2,35 1,79 3,88 1,15 0,68 1,15 2,50 -56,9 -71,1 -35,8 -35,4 
Source: SORS – import customs declarations for the years 1998 and 2001       
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For the estimation of import duties after the inclusion of Slovenia into the EU, we used the 
following assumptions/steps: 
 
a) We used official tariff rates of the EU Common External Tariff, applicable for the year 
2001. Using the values of imports from the third countries in the year 2000 (the last 
complete year available from the COMEXT data base at the moment of calculations) 
we calculated the average official tariff rates and average ad-valorem levies. Specific 
tariffs and levies to be paid on the unit of particular product were transformed into the 
ad-valorem equivalents with the use of data on the net weight and the value of imports 
from third countries. The most problematic items have been certainly products with 
seasonal duties or levies based on the content of starch, milk fat, sugar or alcohol – for 
these items we used some average values of the content and relevant levies. According 
to the relevance of these items in the Slovenian imports, the possible mistake made 
using the above assumptions regarding the content will not be of great importance. 
Namely, these items represented only 1,2% of the total Slovenian imports from the 
'Rest of the World' in the year 2001 and their share in the estimated import duties were 
less than 2%. 
b) We further assumed that estimated rates would not change in the analyzed period 2001-
2006. 
c) In the next step the average share of the collected import duties (source was EU budget 
for the year 2000) into the estimated official import duties were calculated - 
Table 2: The structure of imports from EU15 according to the implementation of Europe Agreement     
in the year 2001 
TOTAL Preferential trade  agreement  
Other preferential   
quotas 
Non-preferential  
imports 
SECTOR 
Imports 
 (mio SIT) 
Import duties 
% 
Share in 
imports % 
Import duties 
% 
Share in 
imports % 
Import duties 
% 
Share in 
imports % 
Import duties 
% 
A 26.034 6,5 36,2 0,0 19,8 4,2 44,0 12,9 
B 782 2,2 0,1 0,0 1,7 2,0 98,1 2,2 
CA 2.504 0,0 9,5 0,0 71,8 0,0 18,6 0,1 
CB 5.446 0,0 41,7 0,0 0,1 0,4 58,2 0,1 
DA 63.908 11,8 0,0 0,0 14,3 2,3 85,7 13,3 
DB 123.242 0,1 54,6 0,0 24,8 0,0 20,5 0,3 
DC 40.175 0,1 47,9 0,0 23,0 0,0 29,1 0,5 
DD 18.390 0,1 75,7 0,0 13,7 0,0 10,7 1,3 
DE 65.172 0,1 66,4 0,0 7,6 0,0 26,0 0,4 
DF 74.176 0,0 79,2 0,0 2,3 0,0 18,6 0,0 
DG 206.609 0,1 66,7 0,0 25,1 0,0 8,3 1,7 
DH 71.726 0,2 89,5 0,0 6,4 0,1 4,1 3,7 
DI 43.815 0,1 91,0 0,0 7,2 0,0 1,8 4,2 
DJ 209.676 0,1 75,9 0,0 17,9 0,0 6,2 1,3 
DK 203.726 0,2 74,3 0,0 20,0 0,0 5,7 2,8 
DL 194.678 0,2 53,2 0,0 14,1 0,1 32,7 0,6 
DM 277.140 0,1 64,2 0,0 32,4 0,0 3,4 3,5 
DN 34.827 0,4 92,0 0,0 0,9 0,5 7,1 5,7 
E 4.010 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 100,0 0,0 
Total 1.666.036 0,7 64,8 0,0 19,2 0,2 15,9 4,1 
Import 
duties/  
structure 11.324 100,0 1 0,0 487 4,3 10.836 95,7 
Source: SORS – customs declarations for the 2001, own calculations     
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unfortunately, because of the lack of data, only for the two groups of products 
(agricultural and other industries products). With these two shares we tried to estimate 
the final outcome of the complicated system of EU foreign trade regime. Results show 
that EU on average collected only 49% of import duties if the official rates would be 
applied (68% for the other industries products and only 11% for the agricultural 
products). 
d) With these two shares estimated official tariff rates and agricultural levies were 
corrected in the next step. Using this procedure we arrived to the estimated rates of 
collected import duties for each 8-digit item of EU Common External Tariff. 
e) In the final step data on the values of imports separated from EU15, ‘Laeken’ Group 
and ‘The rest of the World’ were added to the database with the estimated rates of 
collected import duties and the value of collected import duties estimated for the year 
2001 using the above stated assumptions regarding the rates of collected import duties. 
We thus obtained weighted average rates of collected import duties for imports from 
other countries (table 3) for which we further assumed that they would remain the same 
also for the period 2004-2006.3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3  Aggregation was based on the sectors in the CGE model.  Due to the problems with losses in two 
sectors they were added to the other sectors (sector DF to sector E, and sector DC to sector DN). 
Table 3: Estimation of changes in rates of import duties after the      
              adoption of EU Common External Tariff (2001 prices)   
Situation in 2001 Inclusion into the EU 
Sector 
EU15 ‘Laeken’ Group Rest of the World 
 
Rest of the 
World 
 
A 6,52 2,84 2,00 1,76 
B 2,16 0,96 2,39 1,36 
C 0,03 0,04 0,29 0,40 
DA 11,75 10,56 7,65 1,80 
DB 0,07 0,50 6,57 6,95 
DD 0,14 0,16 0,81 0,62 
DE 0,11 0,03 1,06 0,92 
DG 0,14 0,04 0,91 2,87 
DH 0,16 0,15 4,07 3,90 
DI 0,08 0,16 1,40 2,94 
DJ 0,08 0,05 0,85 2,51 
DK 0,16 0,35 3,29 1,59 
DL 0,20 0,27 1,73 1,00 
DM 0,13 0,08 5,71 5,49 
DN 0,27 0,38 10,08 3,50 
E 0,01 0,03 0,03 2,28 
Total 0,68 1,15 2,50 2,37 
Import duties 
(bill. SIT) 11,324 2,402 14,724 13,947 
Source: SORS – import customs declarations for the year 2001, EU Common External  
                            Tariff , own calculations 
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In the year 2001 almost half of total import duties were collected on imports of products 
from EU15 and candidate countries. With the entrance into the EU Slovenia will loose 
these import duties. On the other hand Slovenia collected 14,7 bill. SIT on products 
imported from other countries with the average rate of 2,5%. 
 
The use of the estimated rates of collected import duties on the imports of the EU from the 
Rest of the World on the Slovenian structure of imports from the Rest of the World did not 
change the average rate of import duties on the aggregate level by high margin (from 
2,50% to 2,37%). Collected import duties would thus amount to 13,9 bill. SIT. Comparison 
of rates on the sector level reveal the most important changes in the sectors of food, 
beverages and tobacco industries, furniture and other non-covered products of 
manufacturing, for which rates will substantially decrease. 
 
These, estimated rates of collected import duties for Slovenian imports from ‘the Rest of 
the World’ countries, together with assumption of the null rates for the imports from the 
EU15 and ‘Leaken’ group countries, estimated trade creation/diversion effect and growth 
of imports were than used for the estimation of the values of traditional own resources 
Slovenia will pay to the EU budget after the inclusion into the EU.4 Final results are 
presented in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taking into account that in fact all 10-candidate countries will enter into the EU in the year 
2004, it can be concluded that Slovenian traditional own resources payments in the period 
2004-2006 will be between 10,3 and 11,8 bill. SIT (1999 prices) or 54,6 and 60,6 mio. 
EUR (1999 exchange rate).5 
 
It can be concluded that continued process of foreign trade liberalization will cause 
substantial reduction of budget revenues based on import duties. Remained revenues based 
                                                 
4  For complete presentation of the estimation of traditional own resources Slovenia will have to pay to 
the EU budget see Majcen (2002). 
5  Assumption that Croatia and FYR of Macedonia completelly take the advantages of the signed 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, would decrease the estimated traditional 
own resources payments to 8,2 - 9,8 bill. SIT or 44,3- 50,7 mio. EUR. In reality Croatian exporters 
could take the advantage of preferential treatment for the minor part of their exports to the EU. It can 
be thus concluded that the estimated value would be closer to the higher numbers in the Table 4 that 
did not take into account SAA. 
 
 
Table 4: Estimation of TOR to be paid in the period 2004-2006 
 
mio SIT 1999 mio EUR 1999 
SCENARIO 
2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 
1. Inclusion of all 10 candidate countries  
10266 11011 11769 52,9 56,7 60,6 
2. Inclusion of 4 candidates in the year 
2004 and trhe others in the year 2005  10600 11011 11769 54,6 56,7 60,6 
Source: Majcen (2002) 
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on import duties will represent 25% of import duties collected on the imports from ‘The 
rest of the World’ countries. In the year 1998 budget revenues from import duties 
amounted to almost 48 bill. SIT (1999 prices), and in the year 2001 represented only a half 
of the 1998 amount (23,2 bill. SIT). With the entrance into the EU we will loose additional 
9,5 bill. SIT because of the complete liberalization of imports from the EU and ‘Laeken’ 
group countries, and also additional 10,2 bill. SIT transferred into the EU budget. Only 3,4 
bill. SIT will be left for covering the costs of collection of import duties. 
 
The estimates we arrived to, using as real assumptions and data as possible, are 
significantly higher from the first and also the last EU estimates where they used revised 
volume of Slovenian GNP (28-29 mil. EUR per year). Both EU estimates are using some 
very simplifying assumptions – the same share of import duties in the GNP as is the 
average share for the EU countries, the same average rate of collected import duties as was 
the average rate of import duties for the imports from ‘The rest of the World’ countries in 
the year 2001, further decrease in this average rate because of the future new preferential 
agreements is fully compensated with the future growth of imports (all candidate countries 
have the same import structure and the same rate of growth), there is no trade 
creation/diversion effect.  
 
On the other hand we based our estimations on the 8-digit CN levels taking into the 
account our import structure from ‘The rest of the World’ countries, using the share of 
collected/official rates of import duties for two groups of products (agriculture and other 
products). We further estimated also the possible trade creation/diversion effects using the 
general equilibrium model of Slovenian economy. The possible mistake because of the 
assumed unchanged rates of import duties depends on the importance of the future 
preferential agreements of the EU with third countries for the Slovenian imports. We do 
believe that, taking all considerations into account, real TOR for the period 2004-2006 will 
be much closer to our estimates than to the EU ones. 
 
It can be concluded that all direct effects of continued process of foreign trade 
liberalization have not been taken into account when the net budget position of Slovenian 
budget has been calculated. On one hand Slovenian budget revenues will decrease for 
additional 41.5 – 65.7 mil. EUR in 1999 prices and on the other hand we will not pay only 
29 mil. EUR of traditional own resources into the EU budget each year, but from 52.9 to 
60.9 mil. EUR (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Corrections of the Slovenian net budget position due to the complete liberalization of 
foreign trade with EU and candidate countries and adoption of EU Common 
External Tariff (mill. EUR, 1999 prices) 
 
 
Correction 
 
2004 2005 2006 
1. Budget revenues -41.5* -63.6 -65.7 
2. Transfers to EU budget -15.9* -18.5 -21.3 
       3.     Total -57.4* -82.1 -87.0 
* only for the eight months period due to the date of accession of 1.5. 2004 
Source: Majcen (2002), own calculations 
 
 
 8 
 
 
3. TRANSFERS BETWEEN SLOVENIAN AND EU BUDGET 
 
Considering the negotiation process which has been concluded on 13. of December 2002 in 
Copenhagen, it has to be stated that the real levels of transfers from both sides are not so 
obvious as it may one believe. Namely, there are many different factors that will influence 
the final outcome in reality: a) real growth rates of production and imports after the 
inclusion of Slovenia into the EU, b) inflation rates, c) exchange rate changes, and d) 
absorption capacity of Slovenian economy.  
 
On the other hand we should take into the account also some additional “costs” – Slovenia 
will have to pay to different EU institutions and funds and it will loose significant amount 
of VAT because of decreased efficiency of gathering the tax. One should also take into 
account additional budget sources that will be used to compensate the difference to 
complete volume of direct payments, as well as the additional costs of establishing the 
external Schengen border. 
 
It is obvious that when speaking about the Slovenian net budgetary position after the 
accession we should distinguish two “positions”. The first one, which is stricktly 
considering only the flows between the two budgets. And the second one, which takes into 
the account also additional changes in Slovenian budget due to the accession. Considering 
both figures, we can arrive to the estimate of direct impact of transfers on Slovenian 
budget. Of course, we should also have in mind that the accession into the EU (with 
increased market, lowered costs and increased competition) will have also a favourable 
positive effects on Slovenian economy. Final, direct and indirect, effects will be estimated 
with the use of the CGE model. 
 
Regarding the flows between two budget it could be concluded that at the end of 
negotiations Slovenia succeeded to improve its positive net budgetary position from the 
one in the year 2003 (45 mill. EUR) to the 81 mill. EUR for each year of the period 2004-
2006 (see Table 6). With the added lump-sum cash flow and budgetary compensations 
Slovenian net budgetary position would be positive one arising to 0.32-0.34% of GDP. 
This outcome has been realized due to the finally accepted corrections of the future GDP 
growth rates and revised volumes of GDP. Such a result certainly gives us some additional 
space in the (very possible) situation of lower absorption capacity than assumed of the 
resources from structural funds and rural development. We should also be aware of the fact 
that EU did not accept our estimations of traditional own resources Slovenia will have to 
pay to EU budget. With the revenues lost due to the complete liberalization of foreign trade 
with the EU and other accession countries (see Table 5), quite favourable positive net 
budgetary position disappears! 
 
Adding already stated other additional costs and decreased budget revenues, we arrive to 
the total direct impact of accession on the Slovenian budget position (Table 7). The figures 
were calculated in current prices using assumed 2% annual increase from the year 1999 on. 
The final outcome will be probably even less favourable if we take into account the fact 
that exchange rates are not following completely the inflation rates in Slovenia. 
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TABLE 6: ESTIMATED NET BUDGETARY POSITION AFTER ENLARGEMENT - SLOVENIA       
The calculations are based on revised GDP; 1999 prices, € millions, SIT billions: Planned date of accession: 1 May 2004     
             
  2004 2005 2006 
  EUR SIT % GDP %GNI EUR SIT % GDP %GNI EUR SIT % GDP %GNI 
Pre-accession aid 51.0 9.9 0.22 0.22 43.0 8.3 0.17 0.17 27.0 5.2 0.10 0.10 
1. Agriculture. 43.4 8.4 0.18 0.18 124.6 24.1 0.50 0.51 158.2 30.6 0.61 0.61 
1a - Common Agricultural Policy 14.9 2.9 0.06 0.06 65.2 12.6 0.26 0.27 71.6 13.9 0.28 0.28 
Market measures 14.9 2.9 0.06 0.06 38.3 7.4 0.15 0.16 38.8 7.5 0.15 0.15 
Direct payments 0.0 0.0    26.8 5.2 0.11 0.11 32.8 6.4 0.13 0.13 
1b - Rural development 28.5 5.5 0.12 0.12 59.4 11.5 0.24 0.24 86.6 16.8 0.33 0.34 
2. Structural actions after capping 27.0 5.2 0.11 0.11 59.2 11.5 0.24 0.24 72.8 14.1 0.28 0.28 
Structural Fund 25.9 5.0 0.11 0.11 45.9 8.9 0.19 0.19 48.9 9.5 0.19 0.19 
Cohesion Fund 1.2 0.2 0.01 0.01 13.3 2.6 0.05 0.05 23.9 4.6 0.09 0.09 
3. Internal Policies 49.7 9.6 0.21 0.21 59 11.4 0.24 0.24 66.3 12.8 0.26 0.26 
Existing policies 12.1 2.3 0.05 0.05 20.9 4.0 0.08 0.09 28.2 5.5 0.11 0.11 
Institution building 2.0 0.4 0.01 0.01 2.5 0.5 0.01 0.01 2.5 0.5 0.01 0.01 
Schengen 35.6 6.9 0.15 0.15 35.6 6.9 0.14 0.14 35.6 6.9 0.14 0.14 
Sub-total (1 + 2 + 3) 120.1 23.3 0.51 0.51 242.9 47.0 0.98 0.99 297.3 57.6 1.15 1.15 
Cash flow lump-sum 65.0 12.6 0.27 0.28 18.0 3.5    18.0 3.5    
Total allocated expenditure 236.1 45.7 1.00 1.00 303.8 58.8 1.23 1.24 342.3 66.3 1.32 1.33 
Traditional own resources 18.0 3.5 0.08 0.08 29.0 5.6 0.12 0.12 29.0 5.6 0.11 0.11 
VAT resource 22.0 4.3 0.09 0.09 35.0 6.8 0.14 0.14 36.0 7.0 0.14 0.14 
GNP resource 129.0 25.0 0.55 0.55 198.0 38.3 0.80 0.81 203.0 39.3 0.78 0.79 
UK rebate 17.0 3.3 0.07 0.07 27.0 5.2 0.11 0.11 28.0 5.4 0.11 0.11 
Total own resources 186 36.0 0.79 0.79 289.0 56.0 1.17 1.18 296.0 57.3 1.14 1.15 
Net balance before budgetary compensation 50.1 9.7 0.21 0.21 14.8 2.9    46.3 9.0 0.18 0.18 
Budgetary compensation 30.0 5.8 0.13 0.13 66.0 12.8 0.27 0.27 36.0 7.0 0.14 0.14 
Net balance after budgetary compensation 80.1 15.5 0.34 0.34 80.8 15.6 0.33 0.33 82.3 15.9 0.32 0.32 
Data sources:  The final negotiation results - Copenhagen,  December 2002; Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development (IMAD) and     
                        Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SORS); calculations by Ministry of Finance, Budget Department, December 2002    
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It can be concluded that estimated total direct impact of the Slovenian accession on its net 
budget position will be clearly a negative one. Slovenian budget deficit will increase by 
155 millions of EUR in the first year of accession (if we take into account also one month 
of postponement of VAT payments, the result for the year 2004 would be even lees 
favourable) and will amount to 0.6% of GDP. The greatest increase of deficit is expected 
in the second year after the accession (0.77%).  
 
Of course we should have in mind that all these estimates are only partial ones, without 
taking into account also the reactions of economic agents as well as the government. 
Further trade liberalization, increased domestic market and also competition, lowered 
collected VAT and also lowered transaction costs, will generate changes in domestic 
production, trade, employment, investment and consumption. What will be the final 
outcome is hard to conclude without an appropriate tool. In the next section we will thus 
try to prepare some simulations of possible complex effects of changes in Slovenian 
budgetary position after the accession into the EU using a static computable general 
equilibrium model of Slovenian economy. 
 
4. SIMULATION RESULTS  
 
Simulations were prepared using the corrected version of computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model of Slovenian economy, based on SAM for the year 1998 (Majcen and 
Buehrer, 2001). Namely, we had to correct the ‘Rest of the World’ account by splitting it 
down into two separate accounts: EU15 and ‘Laeken’ Group and on the other side ‘The 
Rest of the World’. We also added a new institution in order to simulate transfers between 
the two budgets after the accession of Slovenia into the EU. 
 
The new version of the CGE model was then used for simulation of the consequences of 
further foreign trade liberalisation in the period after the year 1998 as the outcome of the 
finished process of implementation of FTAs and Europe Agreement, adaptation of 
Customs Tariff to EU Common External Tariff for the manufacturing products, adoption 
of the EU Common External Tariff after the inclusion of Slovenia into the EU and 
estimated transfers between both budgets. 
 
4.1. Foreign trade liberalization 
 
With the CGE Model based on the year 1998, we had to prepare data on collected import 
duties for both groups of countries (EU15+ ‘Laeken’ Group, ‘The rest of the World’) for 
the base year 1998 and the year 2001. Additionally, estimated rates of collected import 
duties on imports from ‘The rest of the World’, valid for the period after the accession 
2004-2006, were also used. In the Table 3 rates of collected import duties implemented 
within the CGE model were presented. The main deficiency of the final estimation is 
certainly the use of only two shares of collected to official import duties. Results on sector 
level are therefore only rough approximation that should be improved in the future 
research work.  
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Table 7: Estimated budget deficit of the Republic of Slovenia after the accession to EU (% of GDP)    
(mil. Of EUR or bill. Of SIT in current prices)       
       
2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006   
mill. EUR bill. SIT 
Expected budget revenues 5,634 5,844 6,088 1,500 1,622 1,752 
Expected budget expenditures 5,852 6,023 6,199 1,559 1,671 1,784 
Expected budget deficit -219 -178 -112 -58 -49 -32 
Expected budget deficit without the EU accession effect (%GDP) -0.97 -0.75 -0.45 -0.97 -0.75 -0.45 
1. Expected transfers from the EU budget 294 417 435 68.4 97.0 101.1 
2. Expected transfers from the Slovenian budget  205 324 340 47.8 75.8 79.2 
3. Expected additional change of the budgetary position after the accession (Σ (3a...3f)) 243 309 303 57 72 71 
3a  Expected decreased amount of collected VAT 0.5% of GDP) 83 133 142 19.4 31.1 33.2 
3b  Obligations towards EU institutions  7 12 21 1.5 2.9 4.8 
3c  Expected decrease of revenues from import duties 46 72 75 10.7 16.7 17.6 
3d  "Top up" payments of direct payments 23 19 14 5.2 4.3 3.3 
3e  Schengen border 67 52 26 15.6 12.0 6.0 
3f  Estimated additional transfers of collected import duties 18 21 24 4.1 4.9 5.7 
4. Increase of budget deficit due to EU accession (1-2-3) -155 -216 -209 -36 -51 -49 
     Increase of budget deficit due to EU accession (% of GDP) -0.60 -0.77 -0.68 -0.60 -0.77 -0.68 
     Total estimated budget deficit  -373 -395 -320 -94 -100 -81 
     Total estimated budget deficit (% of GDP) -1.56 -1.52 -1.13 -1.56 -1.52 -1.13 
Sources:  Final results of negotiations - Copenhagen, December 2002 and Ministry of Finance; calculations made by the budget department and own calculations   
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If we sum up the assumptions used during the estimation of the levels and changes of rates 
of import duties applied within the CGE model, they were the following: 
 
a) Final estimation was based on the estimated collected import duties for the year 
2004; 
b) Valid foreign trade regime is reflected with the share of collected import duties 
compared with the official import duties – in our example in the base year 1998 and 
in the year 2001; 
c) Official rates of EU Common External Tariff, applicable in the year 2001 and 
estimated collected rates reflect also the situation in the analysed period 2004-2006. 
 
With the above assumption simulations were done in two steps. Firstly, we estimated the 
effects of continued foreign trade liberalization due to the implementation of the Europe 
and other FTAs within the period 1998-2001 taking into consideration rates of collected 
import duties. New equilibrium solution for the year 2001 was than applied as a basis for 
comparison with the solution got in the second step where we assumed inclusion of the 
Slovenia into the EU. 
 
Simulations were performed using the estimated elasticities of substitution and 
transformation. Additionally, we tested the sensitivity of the model results on the changes 
of the assumptions regarding the adaptation of wages or employment as well as regarding 
the possible reaction of the government to the changed collected import duties. Decreased 
incomes can be compensated with the decreased government consumption, savings or with 
the introduction of the new tax or increased some already existing one. We assumed that 
government compensates lost revenues with the increased value added tax – the CGE 
model was therefore adapted to find new equilibrium solution with the unchanged 
government consumption and savings, compensating the loss with an increase of the value 
added tax. All simulations were performed using the assumption of fixed aggregated 
balance of payments (and variable balances for both foreign accounts), with the exchange 
rate with EU being the nummeraire and all other assumptions used in the base solution of 
the CGE model.  
 
The effects of the foreign trade liberalization due to the accession into the EU on the 
aggregate level are presented in Table 8. We used only the results with the assumed 
possibility of change in the employment. Simulations 1, 3 and 5 represent the outcome of 
the further foreign trade liberalisation and adoption of EU Common Customs Tariff as well 
as their trade regime after the accession regarding the different possible reactions of the 
government to decreased revenues. Government was assumed to compensate decreased 
revenues either by decreasing consumption (Scenario 1), increasing VAT (Scenario 2), or 
by decreasing savings (Scenario 3).  
 
Revenues from the import duties were estimated to fall for 59% if we compare results with 
the situation in the year 2001. Using this figure in order to compare the estimates of 
collected import duties after the accession (Majcen, 2002), we arrive to the estimate about 
1.5 billion SIT lower (12 bill. SIT in 1999 prices). 
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Table 8: Some macroeconomic effects of foreign trade liberalization process in the period 2001-2004 (changes in %)* 
 
 
AGGREGATE SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO 4 SCENARIO 5 SCENARIO 6 
 Trade 
liberalization 
+ decreased 
VAT 
Trade 
liberalization 
+ decreased 
VAT 
Trade 
liberalization 
+ decreased 
VAT 
1. Labor -0.34 0.55 -2.48 -2.07 0.05 1.05 
2. Capital 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3. Import duties -59.03 -58.41 -60.43 -60.13 -59.11 -58.54 
4. Government consumption -2.30 -2.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5. Government savings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -30.89 -39.66 
5. Investment -0.38 0.33 -2.19 -1.92 -2.05 -1.79 
5. GDP -0.11 0.50 -1.59 -1.32 0.10 0.76 
6. Exports (total) 1.10 2.56 -1.96 -1.19 0.92 2.33 
    - EU25 1.28 2.99 -2.22 -1.32 1.08 2.72 
    - others 0.65 1.53 -1.32 -0.87 0.53 1.37 
7. Imports (total) 1.14 2.47 -1.63 -0.94 0.96 2.23 
    - EU25 1.17 2.53 -1.60 -0.88 0.96 2.25 
    - others 1.11 2.35 -1.66 -1.07 1.00 2.21 
8. GDP deflator -0.73 -0.88 -0.05 -0.03 -0.65 -0.77 
9. VAT+ 0.00 0.00 10.25 13.35 0.00 0.00 
Elasticities of substitution/transformation from (Buehrer,1994) and GTAP data base 
             
*  SCENARIO 1 – quantity of labor is variable (fixed wages), decrease of government consumption is equal to the decreased revenues from import duties; 
    SCENARIO 2 – Scenario 1 + assumed decrease in collected VAT equal to 0.5% of GDP; 
    SCENARIO 3 - quantity of labor is variable (fixed wages), government consumption unchanged, decreased revenues compensated with the increased VAT;  
    SCENARIO 4 -  Scenario 3 + assumed decrease in collected VAT equal to 0.5% of GDP; 
    SCENARIO 5 - quantity of labor is variable (fixed wages), government consumption unchanged, decreased revenues compensated with the decreased gov. savings;  
    SCENARIO 6 – Scenario 5 + assumed decrease in collected VAT equal to 0.5% of GDP; 
 
+ Unchanged government consumption is obtained with the increase of VAT (Scenarios 3 in 4) 
 
Source: simulation results with the CGE model  
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But we should have in mind that as we used the static model this outcome took into 
account only the trade creation/diversion effect due to the changes in import duties and not 
real increase of imports in the period 2001-2004. 
 
Complete liberalisation of imports from EU and candidate countries will decrease import 
prices and thus increase imports from these countries – to preserve unchanged balance of 
payments exports should also rise through decreased prices (partially as the outcome of 
decreased import prices of intermediate goods). Final outcome for the level of GDP and 
employment is slightly negative one (-0.1 and –0.34 respectively) also because of the 
assumed compensating decreased government consumption (-2.3%) and thus decreased 
production of non-market services (Scenario 1). 
 
Another possible government reaction to decreased revenues is appropriate increase of one 
of taxes – here we assumed that VAT should change to the extent that government 
consumption and savings remain unchanged. The outcome of such a policy is clearly a 
negative one for the economy – final necessary increase of VAT was estimated to be 10% - 
with the employment decreased by -2.5%, GDP by –1.6%, investment by  -2.2%, exports 
by 2% and imports by 1.6%. 
 
Compensation with the government savings (-30.9%) does not have a negative effect on 
aggregate employment and GDP with the positive effects of liberalization on trade, but 
again with decreased investment activity. 
 
With the Scenarios 2, 4 and 6 we added also the estimated decrease of the VAT collection 
(0.5% of GDP) in order to see the reaction of the economy.6 It can be concluded that, as 
expected, assumed decreased rates indeed have a favourable positive impact on the 
economy. 
 
If we sum up the results obtained regarding the (isolated) effects of foreign trade 
liberalization, it has to be concluded that the effects are indeed very sensitive to the 
assumed reaction of the government. Insisting on unchanged government consumption 
through the adequate rise in the VAT rate will have a clearly negative effects on the 
Slovenian economy. On the other hand compensation with the decreased government 
savings will have a negative impact on the investment activity and thus on the lower 
growth rate of the economy. In case we have used dynamic CGE model for the simulation 
of changes of particular aggregates compared with the steady growth of the economy, these 
negative effects on investment activity would came out. It is therefore obvious that a static 
CGE model can not provide the final answer about the effects of changes in Slovenian 
budget. Namely, a great share of transfers are connected with the changes in the structure 
and the levels of investment activities or can have indirect effect on investment activity.  
 
4.2. Financial flows between Slovenia and EU after the accession 
 
In this section we tried to get some estimates of the complex effects of accession into the 
EU. Due to the static nature of the model the results obtained did not show complete, short 
                                                 
6  We assumed that the decrease of VAT collection will be the outcome only because of the decreased 
collection on imports of  goods – the basic sector rates were then decreased acordingly and than 
applied in the simulations.  
 
 
 15 
and long run effects, but are mainly focused on the short run outcome – short enough that 
changes in the investment activity can not affect the levels of capital. Nevertheless, we 
tried to capture also some, at least medium run, effects through the assumed decrease of 
transaction costs.  
 
During the preparation of particular scenarios we tried to get as close as possible to the 
reality. We assumed that quantity of labor is variable, that government will try to preserve 
unchanged level of its consumption and savings, compensating the changes with the 
changes in the VAT rate. We did not make any changes in the structure of government 
consumption and in the structure of investment. Finally, eight scenarios have been 
prepared, starting with the foreign trade liberalization and ending with complex set of 
transfers between both budgets, decreased collection of VAT, changes in government 
savings, consumption and subsidies: 
 
a) Scenario 1: further foreign trade liberalization due to the accession into the EU; 
b) Scenario 2: + decreased VAT rate (0.5% of GDP); 
c) Scenario 3: + decreased transaction costs (2% decrease of world import prices); 
d) Scenario 4: + net transfers from the EU budget (0.33% GDP; 0.26% going to 
agriculture); 
e) Scenario 5: + corrected payments of import duties, additional payments to EU 
institutions, additional government investments due to the Schengen border, 
additional direct payments to farmers; 
f) Scenario 6: + lower absorption capacity (only 50% use of the estimated use of 
sources for rural development and sources from structural and cohesion funds); 
g) Scenario 7: + no changes in transaction costs; 
h) Scenario 8: + decrease of government consumption by 5%.  
 
With the assumptions within the Scenarios 1 to 5 we tried to capture the changes in the 
protection, transfers between budgets and some additional costs Slovenia will have after 
the accession. We added also an estimate of decreased transaction costs using the estimates 
prepared for the EU countries (European economy, 1988: p18). We continued with the 
assumed lower absorption capacity in order to get some notion of the possible effects of 
not so unrealistic outcome, no changes in transaction costs (to capture only the very short 
run effects) and the possibility of decreased government consumption. The results on the 
aggregate level are presented in Table 9. 
 
The results of first two scenarios were already presented in the previous subsection – 
possible positive effects of foreign trade liberalization disappear if the government tries to 
preserve its unchanged consumption and savings with increased VAT rates. Estimated loss 
in collected VAT on the other hand does have a positive impact on the macro aggregates 
despite the necessary additional increase in the VAT rates. 
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Table 9: Some macroeconomic effects of the accession into the EU (changes in %) 
 
 
 
AGGREGATE 
 
SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO 4 SCENARIO 5 SCENARIO 6 SCENARIO 7 SCENARIO 8 
1. Labor -2.475 -2.071 3.157 5.091 1.996 -0.449 -5.699 -0.928 
2. Capital 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3. Import duties -60.43 -60.13 -58.48 -57.54 -59.08 -60.32 -61.97 -59.15 
4. Government consumption 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -5.000 
5. Government savings 0.000 0.000 0.000 13.88 13.88 13.88 13.88 13.88 
6. Investment -2.193 -1.915 2.166 4.230 3.025 1.018 -3.099 0.989 
7. GDP -1.587 -1.322 2.192 3.485 1.443 1.018 -3.781 -0.440 
8. Exports (total) -1.960 -1.190 5.451 6.951 3.467 1.007 -5.557 1.179 
    - EU25 -2.225 -1.321 6.357 8.054 4.009 1.181 -6.336 1.347 
    - others -1.321 -0.874 3.264 4.285 2.158 0.588 -3.677 0.775 
9. Imports (total) -1.628 -0.936 6.631 8.838 5.343 2.464 -4.972 1.138 
    - EU25 -1.603 -0.879 7.871 10.092 6.589 3.693 -4.876 1.231 
    - others -1.660 -1.067 2.999 5.165 1.691 -1.140 -5.222 0.898 
10. GDP deflator -0.050 -0.030 -0.285 -0.589 0.050 0.499 0.866 -0.723 
11. VAT+ 10.245 13.347 -0.541 -6.489 5.741 15.157 30.618 5.760 
Elasticities of substitution/transformation from (Buehrer,1994) and GTAP data base 
             
    SCENARIO 1 – further foreign trade liberalization and adoption of EU Common Customs Tariff; 
    SCENARIO 2 – Scenario 1 + assumed decrease in collected VAT equal to 0.5% of GDP; 
    SCENARIO 3 – Scenario 2 + decreased transaction costs by 2%;  
    SCENARIO 4 – Scenario 3 + net transfers from the EU budget (0.33% GDP; 0.26% going to agriculture); 
    SCENARIO 5 – Scenario 4 + corrected payments of import duties, additional payments to EU institutions, additional government investments due to the Schengen border, additional direct payments to 
farmers  
    SCENARIO 6 – Scenario 5 + lower absorption capacity (only 50% use of the estimated use of sources for rural development and sources from structural and cohesion funds; 
    SCENARIO 7 – Scenario 6 + no changes in transaction costs; 
    SCENARIO 8 – Scenario 7 + decrease of government consumption by 5%; 
 
Source: simulation results with the CGE model  
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With the accession and the abolishment of borders in the next few years we can expect 
decrease of transaction costs – we assumed that this decrease will be equal to 2% of the 
value of trade with the EU countries.7 As the transaction costs are not explicitly modeled in 
the model, we corrected only import prices by 2%. The results obtained with the Scenario 
3 clearly point out the very positive impact: real GDP would rise by 2.2%, employment by 
3.2%, exports by 5.5% and imports by 6.7% with trade diversion towards EU countries. 
Despite unchanged government consumption and savings, abolished import duties and 
decreased effective VAT rates, new equilibrium VAT rate remained almost unchanged (-
0.5% compared with the base solution in the year 2001). 
 
We than proceeded with the introduction of the officialy estimated net outcome of the 
assumed transfers between two budget (0.33% GDP) and with the increased subsidies for 
agriculture sectors in the amount of 0.26% of GDP. We did not make any corrections in the 
structure of government consumption or investments. Results are, compared to the ones 
obtained in Scenario 3), as expected, even more favourable. Additional inflow of money 
(at the unchanged government consumption and savings) resulted in the even lower VAT 
rates (-6.5%) resulting in higher competitiveness of the economy. 
 
More realistic situation is certainly Scenario 5 with all additional transfers and payments 
from the Slovenian budget included. Results obtained are still positive ones with increased 
GDP, employment, investment and trade, despite the necessary increase of VAT tax to 
compensate all additional transfers and payments. But what could happen if the absorption 
capacity will be lower than assumed (50% of assumed one)? The fact is that EU assumed 
much higher absorption capacity for the new member countries for the use of Structural 
funds than it was obtained for the existing EU countries – with the assumption of 
compensation of lower transfers through the VAT tax which has to rise by 15% and thus 
decrease the competitiveness of the economy, the final outcome show considerable 
decrease in almost all macro aggregates (with still positive changes) with the excemption 
of decreased employment. 
 
All former results could be regarded as the effects in at least medium or long run. Given 
the assumptions and the model used, they show positive net outcome of the Slovenian 
accession into the EU. But they are indeed quite sensible to the assumption of decreased 
transaction costs which will not be realised in a very short period. This was the reason why 
we tried to see the effects without the decreased transaction costs (Scenario 7). Results 
obtained point to the fact that in the very short run a negative outcome of the accession 
should be expected – of course if the government still wants to have unchanged its 
consumption and increased investment activities. In case that the government tries to 
                                                 
7  The direct costs of frontier formalities and associated administrative costs for the private and public 
sector were estimated to be of the order of 1.8% of the value of goods traded within the Community 
(European economy, 1988: p. 18). With the abolishment of technical regulations and other non-
border barriers added this figure was estimated to be, on average, around 2% of firms’ total costs or 
3.5% of industrial value-added. Of course there are great differences between sectors with some 
industrial and service sector branches subject to market entry restrictions which could experience 
considerably higher potential costs and price reductions (energy generating, transport, office and 
defence equipment, financial services, and road and air transport) of the order of 10 to 20%, and even 
more in some cases. It is obvious that in the paper some very important effects of abolishemnt of non-
tariff barriers have not been taken into account. One possible way to capture them would be to 
incorporate estimated ad-valorem equivalents for non-tariff barriers into the existing CGE  model. 
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behave more rational and finds the possibility to decrease its own consumption (5% 
decrease assumed in Scenario 8), this would greatly diminish negative short run effects.  
 
Results obtained show how important is the behavour of the government already in the 
short run after the accession into the EU – rational behaviour will certainly moderate 
possible short run negative effects of the accession and improve already favourable long 
run effects. 
 
4. FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main aim of the paper has been the estimation of the effects of continued process of 
foreign trade liberalization and Slovenian net budgetary position after the accession into 
the EU taking into account also some additional important changes in Slovenian budget.  
For the simulations an adapted CGE model of Slovenian economy has been used.  
 
It can be concluded that continued process of foreign trade liberalization will cause 
substantial reduction of budget revenues based on import duties. Remained revenues based 
on import duties will represent 25% of import duties collected on the imports from ‘The 
rest of the World’ countries. In the year 1998 budget revenues from import duties 
amounted to almost 48 bill. SIT (1999 prices), and in the year 2001 represented only a half 
of the 1998 amount (23,2 bill. SIT). With the entrance into the EU we will loose additional 
9,5 bill. SIT because of the complete liberalization of imports from the EU and ‘Laeken’ 
group countries, and also additional 10,2 bill. SIT transferred into the EU budget. Only 3,4 
bill. SIT will be left for covering the costs of collection of import duties. Important is also 
conclusion that these estimates are higher than the estimates prepared by the EU. Because 
of the use of several more realistic assumptions it should be pointed out that the study 
represents professional basis for the argumented discussion regarding the realistic value of 
the traditional own resources that Slovenia will be paying into the EU budget. 
 
Regarding the Slovenian net budgetary position after the accession we should distinguish 
two “positions”. The first one, which is stricktly considering only the flows between the 
two budgets. And the second one, which takes into the account also additional changes in 
Slovenian budget due to the accession. Regarding the flows between two budget it could 
be concluded that at the end of negotiations Slovenia succeeded to improve its positive net 
budgetary position from the one in the year 2003 (45 mill. EUR) to the 81 mill. EUR for 
each year of the period 2004-2006. With the added lump-sum cash flow and budgetary 
compensations Slovenian net budgetary position would be positive one arising to 0.32-
0.34% of GDP. This outcome has been realized due to the finally accepted corrections of 
the future GDP growth rates and revised volumes of GDP. Such a result certainly gives us 
some additional space in the (very possible) situation of lower absorption capacity than 
assumed of the resources from structural funds and rural development.  
 
On the other hand we should take into account decreased budget revenues due to the 
complete liberalisation of trade with the EU and candidate countries as well as the 
decreased efficiency of value added tax collection. And, there will be additional transfers 
to the EU institutions and increased costs due to the preparation of Schengen border with 
Croatia and “top up” direct payments to farmers. Taking into account also these figures we 
arrive to the total direct impact of accession on the Slovenian budget position, which will 
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be clearly a negative one. Slovenian budget deficit will increase by 155 millions of EUR in 
the first year of accession and will amount to 0.6% of GDP. The greatest increase of deficit 
is expected in the second year after the accession (0.77%). Of course we should have in 
mind that all these estimates are only partial ones, without taking into account also the 
reactions of economic agents as well as the government. Further trade liberalization, 
increased domestic market and also competition, lowered collected VAT and also lowered 
transaction costs, will generate changes in domestic production, trade, employment, 
investment and consumption. 
 
The new version of the CGE model was used for simulation of the consequences of further 
foreign trade liberalisation in the period after the year 1998 as the outcome of the finished 
process of implementation of FTAs and Europe Agreement, adaptation of Customs Tariff 
to EU Common External Tariff for the manufacturing products, adoption of the EU 
Common External Tariff after the inclusion of Slovenia into the EU and estimated transfers 
between both budgets.  
 
During the preparation of particular scenarios we tried to get as close as possible to the 
reality. We assumed that quantity of labor is variable, that government will try to preserve 
unchanged level of its consumption and savings, compensating the changes with the 
changes in the VAT rate. We did not make any changes in the structure of government 
consumption and in the structure of investment. Finally, eight scenarios have been 
prepared, starting with the foreign trade liberalization and ending with complex set of 
transfers between both budgets, decreased collection of VAT, changes in government 
savings, consumption and subsidies. 
 
The results of first scenario show that possible positive effects of foreign trade 
liberalization dissapear if the government tries to preserve its unchanged consumption and 
savings with increased VAT rates. Estimated loss in collected VAT on the other hand does 
have a positive impact on the macro aggregates despite the necessary additional increase in 
the VAT rates. 
 
With the accession and the abolishment of borders in the next few years we can expect 
decrease of transaction costs – the results obtained with the Scenario 3 clearly point out the 
very positive impact: real GDP would rise by 2.2%, employment by 3.2%, exports by 5.5% 
and imports by 6.7% with trade diversion towards EU countries. Despite unchanged 
government consumption and savings, abolished import duties and decreased effective 
VAT rates, new equilibrium VAT rate remained almost unchanged (-0.5% compared with 
the base solution in the year 2001). 
 
Results were even more favourable with the officialy estimated net outcome of the 
assumed transfers between two budget and with the increased subsidies for agriculture 
sectors added (Scenario 4). Additional inflow of money (at the unchanged government 
consumption and savings) resulted in the even lower VAT rates (-6.5%) resulting in higher 
competitiveness of the economy. 
 
More realistic situation was captured in Scenario 5 with all additional transfers and 
payments from the Slovenian budget included. Results obtained were still positive ones 
with increased GDP, employment, investment and trade, despite the necessary increase of 
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VAT tax to compensate all additional transfers and payments. But what could happen if the 
absorption capacity will be lower than assumed (50% of assumed one)? With the 
assumption of compensation of lower transfers through the VAT tax which has to rise by 
15% and thus decrease the competitiveness of the economy, the final outcome show 
considerable decrease in almost all macro aggregates (with still positive changes) with the 
excemption of decreased employment. 
 
All former results could be regarded as the effects in at least medium or long run. Given 
the assumptions and the model used, they show positive net outcome of the Slovenian 
accession into the EU. But they are indeed quite sensible to the assumption of decreased 
transaction costs which will not be realised in a very short period. This was the reason why 
we tried to see the effects without the decreased transaction costs (Scenario 7). Results 
obtained point to the fact that in the very short run a negative outcome of the accession 
should be expected – of course if the government still wants to have unchanged its 
consumption and increased investment activities. In case that the government tries to 
behave more rational and finds the possibility to decrease its own consumption (5% 
decrease assumed in Scenario 8), this would greatly diminish negative short run effects.  
 
Results obtained show how important is the behavour of the government already in the 
short run after the accession into the EU – rational behaviour will certainly moderate 
possible short run negative effects of the accession and improve already favourable long 
run effects. 
 
At the end we would like to point out some limitations and deficiencies of the research 
activities done. Firstly, with the assumed perfect competition and constant economies of 
scale, it was not able to come closer to reality at least for some sectors. Secondly, we did 
not modeled any changes in the structure of government consumption and in the structure 
of investment. Thirdly, due to the static nature of the model the results obtained did not 
show complete, short and long run effects, but are mainly focused on the short run 
outcomes – short enough that changes in the investment activity can not affect the levels of 
capital. Nevertheless, we tried to capture also some, at least medium run, effects through 
the assumed decrease of transaction costs. In case we have used dynamic CGE model for 
the simulation of changes of particular agregates compared with the steady growth of the 
economy, changes of  investment activity would came out. It is therefore obvious that a 
static CGE model can not provide the final answer about the effects of changes in 
Slovenian budget. Namely, a great share of transfers are connected with the changes in the 
structure and the levels of investment activities or can have indirect effect on investment 
activities. We will certainly try to overcome all these deficiencies in our future research 
work with development and use of dynamic general equilibrium model of Slovenian 
economy. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE SINGLE COUNTRY CGE MODEL 8 
 
 
In the CGE model used Slovenia is treated as a small country for the purposes of both 
imports and exports. Given the focus of the paper, trade with the EU is separated from 
trade with the rest of the world. Output is created from a combination of capital, labor and 
intermediate goods by profit-maximizing firms. Labor markets are assumed either to be 
subject to a fixed wage or a fixed supply of labor, depending on the simulation. Firms 
either sell their output domestically or into the international market. The transformation of 
output into either domestically consumed or aggregate export goods is imperfect. 
Transforming aggregate exports into specific exports for the two regions is imperfect, 
though less so than the transformation from domestic output into domestic and aggregate 
export goods.   
 
Domestic consumption is met from a cost-minimizing mix of domestic and imported goods 
from the two regions. Domestically produced and aggregate imported goods are assumed 
to be imperfect substitutes in consumption. Imports from different regions are assumed to 
be imperfectly substitutable with each other, though more substitutable with each other 
than with domestic goods. Final domestic demand can take the form of intermediate goods, 
goods for household or government consumption, or goods for investment in physical 
capital or inventories.  
  
The distribution of income and savings closes the model. The 1998 SAM contains a 
relatively rich specification of income flows in Slovenia. Income for labor services is 
mostly paid to households, while a small portion of labor income is paid directly abroad.9  
All income for capital services is paid to enterprises that use that income, along with 
payments from foreign countries, to pay taxes, interest, transfers, payments to foreigners, 
and dividends to households. The government receives tax revenues while paying for 
interest, transfers, subsidies, and government services. Households, firms, and the 
government also save a portion of their income and investment is assumed to be equal to 
saving less private payments of interest abroad.   
 
1. Production of Output and the Employment of Labor 
 
Since this is a short run model, firms are assumed to have a fixed stock of capital. If the 
sector is tradable, there are three potential markets (domestic, EU, and rest of the world) 
into which producers can sell their output. Prices of domestic goods are endogenously 
determined while exports are exogenously priced in foreign currency. Profit maximization 
requires that producers select the appropriate level of labor given the value of output. The 
solution to this producer problem is set out in the model in equations 27 - 29. 
 
                                                 
8 See Majcen and Buehrer (2001) for broader presentation of the model. 
9   There is also a small amount of income received by labor from foreign sources. 
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For the purpose of explanation, assume that producers in each sector, i, take their sale 
price, PXi, as given. Since value added is combined in fixed proportions with intermediate 
inputs to form final output, the price of value added, PVi, can be determined from the price 
of final output, PXi, adjusted for any production subsidy, indtaxi, the prices of intermediate 
goods, Pi, and the input/output coefficients, ijaa .
10  (Eq. 24.) Labor, Li, and capital, Ki, are 
combined in a Cobb-Douglas production function to generate the value-added portion of 
output, XDi.  (Eq. 27.)  With capital fixed, there are decreasing returns to labor. The total 
labor supply, LSi, is fixed in the simulations with a variable wage and endogenous in the 
simulations using a fixed wage. 
 
The production function implies Eq. 28 as the first order condition with respect to the only 
variable input, labor. In this equation, observed sector-specific wage differentials can be 
incorporated through the wdisti coefficient. Due to a lack of sector specific wage 
information, wdisti is assumed to be one in all sectors at this time. The labor supply 
constraint (Eq. 29), in combination with the labor demand equation establishes the market 
clearing wage, W, in the simulations that have a variable wage, or the labor supply, LS, in 
the simulations that have a fixed wage. 
 
2. The Allocation of Output between Domestic and Export Markets 
 
The previous discussion has assumed that the price of final output is fixed.  In the model, 
that price is endogenously determined through a series of constant elasticity of 
transformation functions and the assumptions that export demand is perfectly elastic.11   
  
Since there are two export accounts in this model, one for the EU and one for the rest of 
the world, a method of allocating exports between regions must be used.  In some multi-
country trade models, this is done by assuming that there is a single transformation 
function that includes exports to all markets. See e.g. Hinojosa-Ojeda, Robinson and 
Tesche (1992).  This is simple, but it generally results in elasticities of transformation that 
are the same between sales to all markets. Alternatively, a multi-tiered transformation 
system can be used. See e.g. Buehrer and di Mauro (1993). This is somewhat more flexible 
in that it allows the elasticity of transformation between the two export markets to differ 
from the elasticity of transformation between domestic uses and exports. In this model, the 
second approach is used.   
  
Formally, domestic output, XDi, is first transformed either into domestically used goods, 
XXDi, or aggregate exports, AEi, using a constant elasticity of transformation function and 
the first order condition of the profit maximization of the transformation function (Eqs. 10-
11). Aggregate exports are then transformed into different goods for the two foreign 
markets, Eireg, through another constant elasticity of transformation function and its first 
                                                 
10   To make the equations easier to follow, parameters are in lower case while variables are in upper 
case.  Variables that are fixed in the model have lines over them. 
 
11   This is inconsistent with the findings in Buehrer (1994) that Slovenia generally does not face perfectly 
elastic demand for its exports. To partially address this issue, a separate two-country model has been 
developed that explicitly models EU demand for Slovenia exports.   
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order condition (Eqs. 12-13). Prices for all exports are fixed in foreign exchange and 
export demand is assumed to be perfectly elastic. 
 
 
3. Determination of Demand for Consumption, Investment and Intermediate Use and 
Its Allocation between Domestic and Imported Goods 
 
This section describes the disposition of domestic sales and imports. For the sector without 
imports, domestic sales equal domestic output sold domestically. (Eq. 14) For sectors with 
imports, domestic sales are combined with aggregate imports to meet domestic demand.  
(Eq. 5)  Aggregate imports are a cost minimizing combination of imperfectly substitutable 
imports from the rest of the world and from the EU. The substitution between imports from 
the EU and the rest of the world is modeled using constant elasticity of substitution 
functions, what are known in the literature as Armington functions (Eqs. 3-4).  
 
It is assumed that domestic output and aggregate imports are imperfect substitutes in 
consumption. Domestic sales are assumed to be a cost minimizing combination of 
domestic output and foreign imports. In the model this is represented by Eqs. 6-8, which 
are based on the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS; Deaton and Muelbauer, 1980).12 
Thus, if the world price of imports is unchanged, buyers will purchase a differing mix of 
imports and domestic output as the price of domestic output rises and falls.  
  
Once the allocation of demand between domestic output and imports in tradable sectors is 
determined, the price of composite domestic sales, Pi, can be calculated (Eqs. 8, 16 and 
17). Given this price, the demands of the various actors in the economy for final output can 
be established.  Households are assumed to spend fixed value shares, calphi, of their 
disposable income to purchase goods from each sector i (Eq. 31). Disposable income is 
total household income, YH, less taxes at a tax rate taxh, interest payments HOUINT, 
transfers HTRANF, and household savings at an assumed fixed savings rate, savhhh  (Eq. 
48-53). 
  
Government demand is derived from an exogenously fixed level of real demand allocated 
in fixed shares among a small number of sectors  (Eq. 32). Investment demand by sector is 
based on fixed shares, zzi, of total investment after inventories (Eq. 33).13 The last two 
components of final demand are increases in inventories and intermediate demand. Both of 
these demands are proportional to the level of output. (Eqs. 30 and 34.)  
 
4. The Balance of Income and Expenditure 
 
The description of the demand systems used above has ignored the origin of income for 
each agent. Households are assumed to receive all of the income from labor not sent 
abroad or paid to the government as taxes (Eqs. 51-52). Households also receive income 
                                                 
12   An AIDS function was chosen rather than an Armington function in order to allow for non-unitary 
income elasticities. 
 
13   This is a simplified approach. Many models use a sources/destination table to determine investment 
demand. Unfortunately, such a table was not available for Slovenia for 1998 at this time. 
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from remittances from the rest of the world and certain transfers. Transfers are assumed to 
be fixed in real terms. Since government consumption is fixed, government savings is 
assumed to be the difference between government revenue and consumption, taking into 
account interest payments, subsidies, and payments into the transfer account (Eq. 61).  
Government revenue is the sum of the various tax sources and transfers to the government  
(Eqs. 54-59). The balance of savings and investment is discussed in the section on closure 
below.   
 
5. Model Closure and Numeraire 
 
Several issues with respect to the macroeconomic closure of various markets in this model 
have already been discussed. For instance, labor markets will be closed either by assuming 
a fixed wage or a fixed labor supply. In both cases, since capital is fixed gross returns to 
capital will vary between sectors. 
 
Closure between savings and investment is reached in this model by defining investment as 
equal to savings. Thus there is no independent investment function. Total savings is 
determined as a fixed share of household after-tax income combined with government and 
enterprise savings. Enterprise savings are defined as a fixed fraction of, after tax and 
interest, enterprise income. Government savings is defined as the difference between the 
fixed real level of government expenditure and government revenues from all taxes. 
 
In the foreign exchange market, the exchange rate between the rest of the world and the EU 
is assumed fixed. Thus the exchange rates between Slovenia and the EU and the rest of the 
world move proportionately. Foreign exchange market closure is obtained by assuming 
that the exchange rate with the European Union is fixed. All inbound foreign transfers are 
assumed to be fixed in foreign currency. Outbound transfers are generally functions of 
income, though this varies from item to item. The two separate foreign exchange markets 
clear through changes in domestic prices and changing hard currency transfers from the 
rest of the world account to the EU account. 
  
The nummeraire for the model is the exchange rate with the EU. 
 
6. Calibration of the Model 
 
Many of the parameters in the model come directly from the 1998 SAM. The consumption 
shares, calphi, are the shares of sector consumption in total household consumption. The 
intermediate uses coefficients, ijaa , also are derived directly from the SAM, as are the 
parameters for allocating investment expenditures among goods, zzi. 
 
While these and other parameters come from the SAM, certain behavioral parameters must 
be obtained from other sources. These are primarily the various elasticities of substitution 
and transformation used in the import and export functions. The parameters for price 
elasticities on the import side of the model are drawn from the GTAP model  (Hertel, 
1997). This was done by creating an aggregation of the GTAP model using sectors as 
similar as possible to those used in our version of the 1998 SAM and separating out the EU 
countries from the rest of the world. We then used the derived import demand elasticities 
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from the GTAP model for our simulations. Since the AIDS function also requires income 
elasticities, we drew those from Buehrer (1994) 
 
The calculation of parameters for the export supply functions is more difficult.  The GTAP 
model does not have similar parameters and, as noted in Buehrer (1994) and in Burkett 
(1983), estimation of these parameters is often problematic. For the purposes of the 
simulations in this model, we used a value of 2.0 for the elasticity of transformation 
between domestic and aggregate export goods. The elasticities of transformation between 
exports to the EU and to the rest of world were assumed to be higher. 
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VARIABLES 
 
AEi Aggregate Exports 
AMi Aggregate Imports 
Ci Final Demand For Private 
Consumption   
CAPINreg Inward Payments To Capital 
FSAVINGreg Net foreign savings  by region 
FST Total net foreign savings 
DEPREC Total Depreciation Expenditure   
Eireg Exports By Sector And Region  
ENTINC Enterprise Income 
ENTINT Enterprise Interest Payments  
ENTTAX Enterprise Taxes  
ERreg Nominal Exchange Rate  
EUTAX Additional sales tax  
G(I) Final Demand For Government 
Consumption   
GOVCON Total Volume Of Government 
Consumption 
GOVINT Government Interest Payments  
GOVSAV Government Savings   
GR  Government Revenue   
GTRANF Transfers To Government   
HHOUTFLOreg Outward Household Payments   
HHSAV  Total Household Savings 
HHTAX  Household Tax Revenue   
HOUINT Household Interest Payments   
HTRANF Transfers To Households  
INT(I) Intermediates Uses   
INTEREST  Interest Income   
INTINreg Inward Payments To Interest 
INVEST Total Investment  
INVFA  Investment In Fixed Assets 
INVSTK Inventory Investment 
ITAX   Indirect Tax Revenue 
K i Capital Stock By Sector 
L i Employment By Sector And 
Labor Category 
LABINreg Inward Payments To Labor  
LABINC Labor Income 
LABOUTreg Outward Payments By Labor 
LS  Labor Supply By Labor Category  
Mireg Imports By Sector And Region  
OCAPINC   Other Capital Income 
OMEGA  Objective Function Value 
Pi Buying Price Of Composite 
Goods 
PAEi Price Of The Aggregate Export 
Good 
PAMi Price Of Aggregate Import Good  
PDi Price Paid For Domestic Sales   
PEireg Domestic Price Of Exports 
PINDEX  GDP Price Deflator  
PKi Price Of Composite Capital 
Good By Sector   
PMireg Domestic Price Of Imports 
PRCAPreg Outward Capital Payments  
PRINTreg Private Interest Payments  
 
 
 
PSDi Price Received For Domestic 
Sales  
PVi Value Added Price By Sector  
PVGDP  GDP At Market Prices 
PWEireg World Market Price Of Exports   
PWMireg Market Price Of Imports   
PXi Average Output Price By Sector  
PZi Selling Price Of Composite 
Goods   
REMITreg Remittance To Households From 
The Row   
RGDP   Real GDP   
SALTAX Sales Tax Revenue 
SAVING Total Savings  
STAX1i Sales Tax Rate 
STKi Inventory Investment By Sector   
SUBSIDY   Production Subsidy Amount  
TARIFF Tariff Revenue 
TRANINreg Inward Payments To Transfers 
TRANOUTreg Outward Transfers   
TRANSFER  Total Resources Transferred 
W Average Wage Rate By Labor 
Category   
WALRAS Variable To Verify Walras Law 
Xi Composite Goods Supply  
XDi Domestic Output By Sector  
XXDi Domestic Sales 
Y   Private GDP 
YH  Total Income By Household 
Type   
Zi Final Demand For Productive 
Investment
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PARAMETERS 
 
a0i Aids Import Demand Price Index 
Intercept Term 
a1i Aids Import Demand Base Share 
aaI,j Input-Output Coefficient Table 
adi Production Function Shift 
Parameter 
αi Labor Share Parameter In 
Production Function 
ai Shift Parameter For Import Source 
Armington Function 
ati CET Function Shift Parameter 
at1i Shift Parameter For Export Source 
CET Function 
bi Aids Import Demand Income 
Effect Coefficient 
bti CET Function Share Parameter 
calphi Cobb Douglas Consumption 
Parameters 
corptax Tax Rate On Corporations 
deltai Share Parameter For Import 
Source Armington Function 
depri Depreciation Rates 
einter Fraction Of Interest Income Going 
To Enterprises 
etrano Fraction Of Transfer Income 
Going To Enterprises 
g1i Aids Import Demand Price Effect 
Coefficient 
γi Share Parameter For Domestic Vs 
Export CET Function 
χi Share Parameter For Export 
Source CET Function 
ggi Government Consumption Shares 
gtrano Fraction Of Transfer Income 
Going To Government 
hhoutsreg Share of Household Payments 
Abroad Going to Each Region 
hinter Fraction Of Interest Income Going 
To Households 
hoento Fraction Of Enterprise Income 
Going To Households 
htrano Fraction Of Transfer Income 
Going To Households 
 
 
 
indtaxi Indirect Tax Rates By Sector 
invi Ratio Of Inventory Investment To 
Gross Output 
laboutsreg Share of Payments from Labor to 
Each Region 
ocento Fraction Of Enterprise Income 
Going To Other Capital 
prcapsreg Share To Each Region of 
Outbound Capital Payments 
printsreg Share To Each Region Of 
Outbound Private Interest 
Payments 
ρi Elasticity Parameter For Import 
Source Armington Function 
ρti Cet Function Elasticity Parameter 
ϕti Elasticity Parameter For Export 
Source Cet Function 
saento Fraction Of Enterprise Income 
Going To Savings 
savh Marginal Propensity To Save Of 
Households  
staxi Sales Tax On Domestic Production 
subi Rate Of Subsidy By Sector 
taxh  Income Tax Rate On Households 
taxint Tax Rate On Interest Income 
tmireg  Tariff Rates On Imports 
tranoutsreg Share of Transfers Going to Each 
Region 
trento Fraction Of Enterprise Income 
Going To Transfers 
wdisti Ratio Of Sector Wage To Average 
Wage 
zzi Shares Of Investment By Sector Of 
Destination 
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INDICES 
 
i Sectors 
reg Regions:  EU and ROW 
itm Tradable Import Sectors 
ite Tradable Export Sectors 
inm Non-Tradable Import Sectors 
ine Non-Tradable Import Sectors 
ser Service sectors 
nser Non-service sectors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
